Aquesta és una còpia de la versió author's final draft d'un article publicat a la revista Journal of ambient intelligence and humanized computing. Abstract In this paper, we propose two new ways for efficient secure outsourcing the the decryption of keypolicy attribute based encryption (KP − ABE) with energy efficiency. The first way base on an observation about the permutation property of the access structure of the attribute based encryption schemes. We propose a high efficient way for outsourcing the decryption for KP-ABE based on this observation, and it can be used for mobile devices for its high efficiency, but it can only be used for the ABE schemes having tree-like access structure and the self-enclosed system. The second way
base on another observation that almost all the previous work on outsourcing the decryption of KP −ABE cares little about the ciphertext length. Almost all the previous schemes have linear length ciphertext with the attributes or the policy. But we know that transferring so long ciphertexts via wireless network for mobile phone can easily run out the energy of the battery, which hesitates the adaption of these solutions in actual scenarios. Thus we propose another new scheme to outsource the decryption of ABE but with constant-size ciphertexts, which can achieve high energy efficiency. Furthermore, we propose a new very efficient way to secure outsource the decryptor's secret key to the cloud, which cost only one modular exponentiation. We roughly evaluate the efficiency of our proposals and the results show that our proposals are practical.
Introduction
In these days, cloud computation is a very hot research topic for its promising properties of cheap management cost for users, any where/any time access, and very scalable software and hard ware investigation. However, before adapting cloud computation, data owners should ensure their data shall be secure and well protected. Attribute based encryption is a very promising technique to store data owner's data for flexible secure access controlling on the ciphertexts. However, attribute based encryption is a public key primitive and use tools needing huge computation cost like bilinear pairings. Thus it is desired to outsource this huge cost to the cloud. In this paper, we concentrate on one scenario of outsouring for cloud computation: how to securely outsourcing the decryption of attribute based encryption to the cloud, which has important application for mobile users. Consider the following scenario:
"Data owner Alice outsource her data sets to the cloud, before outsourcing her data to the cloud, she first encrypt her data by using attribute based encryption such as KP-ABE and outsource the ciphertexts to the cloud. Data user Bob want to use the data items for which his credential can decrypt, but he is on a vacation and can only use mobile phone. Thus if he decrypt the downloading ciphertexts directly, his mobile phone can not implement this for the huge computation load. Thus he needs some mechanism to outsouce the decrypting to the cloud, this is called the mechanism of outsourcing decryption of attribute based encryption to the cloud. Another important issue is the length of the ciphertexts, if the length is very long outsoucing the ciphertexts to the cloud will cost lots of energy for the mobile phone, which will sharply shorten the living time of the mobile phone and this is intolerable. Thus we also care about the length of ciphertexts when outsourcing the decryption of attribute based encryption to the cloud."
Here we review some previous work on this topic. Green et al. [14] in 2011 proposed a very efficient way for outsourcing decryption of attribute based encryption, which is a wonderful result for adapting ABE for mobile equipments. However, this work care little about the verifiability for the computation results, the cloud can cheat the data users without any noticing. Therefore, Lai et al. [15] proposed a new way to outsource decryption of ABE with verifiability, but their scheme is not very efficient. Li et al. [19] also proposed a way to outsource encryption/key generation/decryption of ABE with checkability, but their scheme need often interaction with the PKG. Recently, Qin et al. [22] proposed an very efficient way to outsource decryption of ABE with verifiability.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose two new ways for efficient secure outsourcing the the decryption of key-policy attribute based encryption (KP − ABE) with energy efficiency. The first way base on an observation about the permutation property of the access structure of the attribute based encryption schemes, that is, the sequence of attributes are tightly associated with the access structure. If the sequence of attributes have been permutated, the access structure should be changed too. From the permutated sequence of attributes and the changed access structure, the adversary can not easily deduce the original sequence of attributes and the original access structure if there are many attributes like 100 ones in the access structure. We propose a high efficient way for outsourcing the decryption for KP-ABE based on this observation, and it can be used for mobile devices for its high efficiency, but it has its own restriction: it can only be used for the ABE schemes having tree-like access structure while not supporting LSSS structure, and also it can only be used for selfenclosed system. The second way base on another observation that almost all the previous work on outsourcing the decryption of KP − ABE cares little about the ciphertext length. Almost all the previous schemes have linear length ciphertext with the attributes or the policy. But we know that transferring so long ciphertexts via wireless network for mobile phone can easily run out the energy of the battery, which hesitates the adaption of these solutions in actual scenarios. Thus we propose another new scheme to outsource the decryption of ABE but with constant-size ciphertexts, which can achieve high energy efficiency. Furthermore, we propose a new very efficient way to secure outsource the decryptor's secret key to the cloud, which cost only one modular exponentiation. We roughly evaluate the efficiency of our proposals, compared with the pervious work [14, 15, 19, 22] on outsourcing the decryption of ABE, our work can achieve high energy efficiency for the client's mobile devices. Thus our proposals are practical. This paper is based on our previous work [28] but with significant extension, concretely we add the first proposal which is not considered in our previous work, formally prove the security of the second proposal, and evaluate the performance of the second proposal etc.
Related Work
In 2005, Sahai and Waters [23] first proposed the concept of attribute based encryption and give a concrete such construction, which is an extension of fuzzy identity based encryption they also first proposed. In 2006, according to how to embed the access control in the algorithm, Goyal et al. [13] categorized ABE as the key policy ABE and the ciphertext policy ABE, and they also gave the first concrete key policy ABE based on bilinear pairings, this scheme can be proved selective secure in the standard model. Since then, many research results have been achieved. Waters in 2009 [24] first proposed the dual system encryption framework and later [16, 18, 20] use this technique to design several fully secure ABE schemes. Recently, Attrapadung [1] give a interesting framework to transform selective ABE to fully secure ABE. Chase et al. in 2007 [5] proposed the concept of ABE with multi-authority and [6, 17] continues this line of research. Attrapadung et al. [2] [3] [4] 25, 26] proposed serveral variants of ABE with interesting proper-ties such as dual-policy ABE, chosen ciphertext secure ABE, constant size ciphertext ABE, they also discussed some relationship about ABE and other primitives such as conjunctive broadcast encryption and predicate encryption etc. In 2012, Parno et al. [21] first consider ABE's application in secure verifiable outsourcing computation. Garg et al. [10] first proposed the ABE scheme which can support any access control structure which can be expressed as circuits by using the multilinear map, this work can resist the backward-and-shift attack while construction on bilinear map can not. However, almost all the ABE scheme for circuits [12] can only achieve selective security, which is not satisfying. Recently, Garg et al. [11] proposed the first fully secure ABE schemes for circuits and proved the construction's full security by relying on some novel interesting techniques. In another line of research work, Chen et al. [7] [8] [9] try to give high efficient ABE schemes with full security and there are serval notable research results have been achieved. Recently, how to efficient outsource the decryption of ABE has gained great attention and many wonderful results have been achieved [14, 15, 19, 22 ].
Organization
We organize our paper as the following. In section II, we give the definition and security model for outsouced attribute based encryption. In section III, we give our first proposal, roughly analysis its security and give the comparison results. In section IV, we give our second proposal and its security proof, we also give a new way for outsourcing the decryption key, finally we give the performance and comparison results. In the last section, we conclude our paper with many interesting open problems.
Definition and Security Model

Definition
Let S represent a set of attributes, and A an accesss tructure. For generality, we will define (I enc , I key ) as the inputs to the encryption and key generation function respectively. In a KP −ABE scheme (I enc , I key ) = (S, A) while in a CP − ABE scheme (I enc , I key ) = (A, S). A CP −ABE(KP −ABE) scheme with outsourcing functionality consists of five algorithms:
1. Setup(λ, U ). The setup algorithm takes security parameter and attribute universe description as input. It outputs the public parameters P K and a master key M K.
2. Encrypt(P K, M, I enc ). The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters P K, a message M , and an access structure (resp. attribute set)I. It outputs the ciphertext CT . 3. KeyGen out (M K, I key ). The key generation algorithm takes as input the master key M K and an attribute set (resp. access structure) I key and outputs a private key SK and a transformation key T K. 4. Transform(T K, CT ). The ciphertext transformation algorithm takes as input a transformation key T K for I key and a ciphertext CT that was encrypted under I enc . It outputs the partially decrypted ciphertext CT if S ∈ A and the error symbol ⊥ otherwise. 5. Decrypt(SK, CT ). The decryption algorithm takes as input a private key SK for I key and a partially decrypted key ciphertext CT that was originally encrypted under I enc . It outputs the message M if S ∈ A and the error symbol ⊥ otherwise.
Security Model
Definition 1 A CP −ABE or KP −ABE scheme with outsourcing is selective CPA-secure (or selective secure against chosen-plaintext attacks) if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the below game.
The formal security game consists of the following phases:
1. Init. A declares a set of encryption attribute S that will be used to create the challenge ciphertext during Challenge phase, submits S to the challenger. 2. Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the pubilc parameters to the adversary A. 3. Phase 1. The challenger initializes an empty table T , an empty set D and an integer j = 0. Proceeding adaptively, the adversary can repeatedly make any of the following queries:
• Creat(I key ): The challenger sets j := j+1. It runs the outsourced key generation algorithm on I key to obtain the pair (SK, T K) and stores in In this subsection, we describe the system model for our proposal. Our first proposal is mainly aiming at relieve the decryption overhead of mobile users for secure access control system using attribute based encryption in a self-enclosed setting. The self-enclosed system here refers that the cloud can not access the information flow in this system. In this self-enclosed system, there are three roles: the data owners who upload their files to the storage server using attribute based encryption, the data users can scalable access these encrypted files by using their secret keys if the attributes associated with the ciphertext satisfying the access structure tree associated with their secret keys, and the storage servers for storing the uploaded ciphertexts. Outside the selfenclosed system, there exists another party named the cloud service provider. The data users maybe use mobile devices which shall greatly restrict their computation ability, thus it need to outsource the computation work to the cloud, here we mainly focus on how to outsource the decryption of ciphertexts for the mobile devices. In this model, the cloud is a semi-trusted party, which shall be interested to derive the private keys of the data users, note here we do not consider the verifiability of the computation results, which is another issue many other papers have solved.
3.2 Review of GPSW'S Key-Policy ABE
Access Tree
Ciphertexts are labeled with sets of attributes and private keys are associated with access structures that control which ciphertexts a user is able to decrypt.
Access tree Γ . Let Γ be a tree representing an access structure. Each non-leaf node of the tree represents a threshold gate, described by its children and a threshold value. If num x is the number of children of a node x and k x is its threshold value, then 0 ≤ k ≤ num x . When k x = 1, the threshold gate is an OR gate and when k x = num x , it is an AN D gate. Each leaf node x of the tree is described by an attribute and a threshold value k x = 1.
To facilitate working with the access trees, we define a few functions. We denote the parent of the node x in the tree by parent(x). The function att(x) is defined only if x is a leaf node and denotes the attribute associated with the leaf node x in the tree. The access tree T also defines an ordering between the children of every node, that is, the children of a node are numbered from 1 to num. The function index(x) returns such a number associated with the node x. Where the index values are uniquely assigned to nodes in the access structure for a given key in an arbitrary manner.
Satisfying an access tree. Let Γ be an access tree with root r. Denote by Γ x the subtree of Γ rooted at the node x. Hence Γ is the same as Γ r . If a set of attributes γ satisfies the access tree Γ x , we denote it as Γ x (γ) = 1. We compute Γ x (γ) recursively as follows. If x is a nonleaf node, evaluate Γ x (γ) for all children x of node x. Γ x (γ) returns 1 if and only if at least k x children return 1. If x is a leaf node, then Γ x (γ) returns 1 if and only if att(x) ∈ γ.
GPSW Scheme
1. Setup: Let G 1 be a bilinear group of prime order p, and let g be a generator of G 1 . In addition, let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 denote the bilinear map. We also define the Lagrange coefficient ∆ i,S for i ∈ Z p and a set, S, of elements in Z p : ∆ i,S(x) = Π j∈S,j =i x−j i−j . Define the universe of attributes U = {1, 2, · · · , n}.
Key Generation(Γ ):
• For each attribute i ∈ U , choose random number t i uniformly from Z p .
• Choose random number y uniformly in Z p .
• The published public parameters P K is
And the authority's master key M K is:
• Then the authority generates a key that enables the User to decrypt a message encrypted under a set of attributes γ if and only if Γ (γ) = 1. The algorithm proceeds as follows.
(a) Choose a polynomial q x for each node x (including the leaves) in the tree T .These polynomials are chosen in the following way in a top-down manner, starting from the root node r. For each node x in the tree, set the degree d x of the polynomial q x to be one less than the threshold value k x of that node, that is, d x = k x − 1. Now, for the root node r, set q r (0) = y and d r other points of the polynomial q r randomly to define it completely. For any other node x, set q x (0) = q parent(x) (index(x)) and choose d x other points randomly to completely define q x . (b) Once the polynomials have been decided, for each leaf node x, the authority give the following secret key to the user:
where i = att(x).
3. Encryption(M, γ, P K): To encrypt a message M ∈ G 2 under a set of attributes γ, choose a random value r ∈ Z p and publish the ciphertext as:
We specify our decryption procedure as a recursive algorithm.
• We first define a recursive algorithm DecryptN ode(E, D, x) that takes as input the ciphertext E, the private key D (we assume the access tree Γ is embedded in the private key), and a node x in the tree. It outputs a group element of G 2 or ⊥.
• Let i = att(x), if the node x is a leaf node then:
We now consider the recursive case when x is a non-leaf node. The algorithm DecryptN ode(E, D, x) then proceeds as follows: For all nodes z that are children of x, it calls DecryptN ode(E, D, z) and stores the output as F z . Let S x be an arbitrary k x -sized set of child nodes z such that F z =⊥. If no such set exists then the node was not satisfied and the function returns ⊥. Otherwise, we compute
rqx (0) = e(g, g) The access structure is tightly associated with the order of the leaf nodes. For example, in KP-ABE, the ciphertexts are associated with the attribute sets, and the policy is embedded in the private key of the users. But the point is that the ciphertexts shoud have some order, if we change the ciphertexts' order, which mean- s the ciphertext corresponding to the attribute are no longer correct, the decryption result can no longer be correct! CP-ABE also has this feature.
A more detailed description is the following:
In Fig.1 , which is the original access structure I, and the leaf nodes are {1, 2, · · · , 6}, and the order of them is {1 − 2 − 3 − 4 − 5 − 6}. In Fig.2 , we permutated the access structure, which denoted as II, the leaf nodes are still {1, 2, · · · , 6}, but the order of them is {6 − 4 − 5 − 2 − 3 − 1}. In Fig.3 , we further permutated the access structure II to get III, which has more difference. It has more leaf nodes and gates, which hide the topology of I. The leaf nodes are now {1, 2, · · · , 6, 7}, and the order of them is {6 − 4 − 5 − 3 − 1 − 2 − 7}. To get the same derived boolean value, leaf node 3 should have the same boolean value with leaf node 7.
A Concrete Outsourced ABE Scheme
In this section, we give a concrete example to show how the ABE scheme with permutated access structure II works. Our scheme is based on the GPSW scheme [13] (Note GPSW scheme has a threshold access structure, but our Fig.1, 2, 3 all have the boolean formula structure. We emphasis this does not matter for OR gate can be seen as 1-to-1 threshold access structure and AND gate can be seen as a 2-to-1 threshold access structure.)
Key Generation(Γ )):
(a) Choose a polynomial q x for each node x (including the leaves) in the tree T .These polynomials are chosen in the following way in a top-down manner, starting from the root node r. For each node x in the tree, set the degree d x of the polynomial q x to be one less than the threshold value k x of that node, that is, d x = k x − 1. Now, for the root node r, set q r (0) = y and d r other points of the polynomial q r randomly to define it completely. For any other node x, set q x (0) = q parent(x) (index(x)) and choose d x other points randomly to completely define q x . (b) Once the polynomials have been decided, for each leaf node x, the authority generates the following keys:
where i = att(x). Note here Γ = Access Structure I and should be kept private by the decryptor. The data user's outsourced decryption key will be
4. Encryption(M, γ, P K): To encrypt a message M ∈ G 2 under a set of attributes γ, choose a random value r ∈ Z p and compute:
ry , {E i = T r i (i ∈ γ)}) then the encrypter sends these ciphertexts to the data user. 5. Outsource Ciphertext(E, Q): After obtaining the ciphertext E, the decryptor permutes E by using permutation Q E outsource = (Q(γ), Q({E i = T r i (i ∈ γ)})) and outsource them to the cloud. 6. Decryption(E , D ): After obtaining (E , D ), the cloud runs the decryption algorithm as following:
• We first define a recursive algorithm DecryptN ode (E , D , x) that takes as input the ciphertext E , the private key D (we assume the access tree II is embedded in the private key), and a node x in the tree. It outputs a group element of G 2 or ⊥.
-Otherwise, return ⊥. We now consider the recursive case when x is a non-leaf node. The algorithm DecryptN ode(E , D , x) then proceeds as follows: For all nodes z that are children of x, it calls DecryptN ode(E , D , z) and stores the output as F z . Let S x be an arbitrary k x -sized set of child nodes z such that F z =⊥. If no such set exists then the node was not satisfied and the function returns ⊥. Otherwise, the cloud compute
= e(g, g)
ry and returns it to the user, the user then computes
e(g, g) ry
Security Analysis
Theorem 1 Our construction of outsourced attribute based encryption is secure if the underlying permutation of order of leaves and permutation of access structure can not be inverted (e. g. number of the attributes is very large like 100 and the access structure is complex enough).
Proof Here we roughly analysis our proposal's security. For the malicious cloud, although it can get the permutated secret key,
it can not know the concrete permutation, when the attributes are large enough such as 100 ones, it needs to try 100! = 9.33 × 10 1 57 times to knowing the concrete permutation, which shall be too large for a rational cloud service. But we also note our proposal can only be secure in the self-enclosed system, that is, the attributed based encryption ciphertexts can only be known by the data owners and data users, and can not be accessed by the clouds. Otherwise, the malicious cloud may derive the permutation from the original sequence of ciphertexts and the permutated sequence of ciphertexts. We remark here such self-enclosed system is very common in our real life, such as E-health information system in hospital, which can be accessed by Doctors and Patients, but can not be accessed by others outside the hospital like the cloud service providers. Although our proposal is not a perfect solution for generic construction of outsourced attribute based encryption, but it can find its application in many real setting. Note here the mobile data users only need to permutate his secret keys and keep the permutation as the secret key, while all previous proposals for outsourced ABE at least require the data users to do a modular exponential operation for outsourcing the decryption key, thus our proposal is high efficient for the data users. Here we give a roughly comparison results with previous work, our work uses the permutation approach, while all previous work use the cryptographic approach, thus our proposal can be high efficient for the data users.
Comparison
The Second Proposal
System model
Here we describe the system model for our second proposal, which is mainly for reducing the decryption overhead of mobile users for secure access control system using attribute based encryption. The open system here refers that the cloud can easily access the information flow (e.g. ABE ciphertexts) in this system. In this open system, there are four parties: the data owners, the data users, and the cloud storage service provider, and the cloud computing service provider. The data owners first use attribute based encryption to share the datum with the data users via storage server, the data users are often mobile users and need to use the cloud computing service to relieve the decryption overhead. Here the 
Linear ID-based Broadcast Encryption Template
They define a template that IBBE schemes should comply with in order to give rise to (selectively secure) KP-ABE schemes. They call this a linear IBBE template. Let (G, G T ) be underlying bilinear groups of order p. A linear IBBE scheme is determined by parameter n 1 , n 2 ∈ N , a family F of vectors of functions, and a function D of which the latter two are specified by
with requirements specified below. A linear IBBE scheme works as follows.
1. Setup(λ, n). Given a security parameter λ ∈ N and a bound n ∈ N on the number of identities per ciphertext, the algorithm selects bilinear groups (G, G T ) of prime order p and a generators g ← RG. It computes e(g, g) α for a random α ∈ Z * p and chooses functions (f 1 , f 2 , F ) ← F. The master secret key consists of msk = g α while the public key is mpk := (g, e(g, g) α , f 1 , f 2 , F, n, n 1 , n 2 ).
Keygen(msk, ID).
It picks r ∈ R Z * p and computes
3. Encrypt(mpk, M, S). It parses S as S = {ID 1 , · · · , ID q }, where q ≤ n. To encrypt M ∈ G T , it chooses a random exponent s ∈ R Z * p and computes the ciphertext as
αs and obtains M = C 0 /e(g, g) αs .
We are now ready to state the requirements: for all (f 1 , f 2 , F ) ∈ F, the following properties must hold (a) Correctness. For all α, r, s ∈ Z * p , ID ∈ I, S =
Generic Conversion from Linear IBBE to KP-ABE
Let Π IBBE = (Setup , Keygen , Encrypt , Decrypt ) be a linear IBBE system. They construct a KP-ABE scheme from Π IBBE as follows:
The algorithm computes a private key for an access structure that is associated with LSSS scheme (L, π) as follows. Let L be l × k matrix. First it generates shares of 1 with the LSSS scheme (L, π) as follows. Let L be l×k matrix. First, it generates shares of 1 with the LSSS(L, π). Namely, it chooses a vector β = (
k subject to the constraint β 1 = 1. Then for each i = 1 to l, it calculates λ i =< L i , β >, picks r ∈ R Z p and sets D i as follows:
It then outputs the private key as
Assume first that the policy (L, π) is satisfied by the attribute set ω, so that decryption is possible. Let I = {i|π(i) ∈ ω}. It calculates the reconstruction constants
which we prove correctness below. It compute e(g, g) αs =
i∈I (e(g, g) αsλi ) ui and finally obtains M = C0 e(g,g) αs , where we recall that Σ i∈I λ i u i = 1.
Correctness. They now verify that equation (1) is correct. First from a property of keys in linear IBBE, we have that
λi where each equality holds from linearity and correctness of D respectively. The authors also give the security theorem of the above generic construction:
Theorem 2 If the underlying IBBE scheme is selectively secure, then the resulting KP-ABE system is also selectively secure.
IBBE Instantiation with Short Ciphertexts
This subsection presents an IBBE scheme with short ciphertexts and shows how to apply the KP-ABE conversion. This specific IBBE can be seen as an instance of the functional encryption (FE) for zero inner-product, which itself is implied by spatial encryption of [10] . A FE system for zero inner-product is defined by a relation
The technique of deriving an IBBE scheme from a FE scheme for zero inner-product can be traced to [23] . A private key for an identity ID is defined by setting X = (
T as a coefficient vector from
where, if q + 1 ≤ n, the coordinates y q+2 , · · · , y n are set to 0. By doing so, we note that P S [ID] =< X, Y > evaluates to 0 iff ID ∈ S. We now describe the IBBE instantiated from the FE system of [4] . Its selective security is an immediate consequence of [4] , where it is proved under the DBDHE assumption.
The master secret key is msk = α, and the public key is mpk = (g, e(g, g)
The algorithm first defines a vector X = {x 1 , · · · , x n } T such that x i = ID i−1 for i = 1 to n. It chooses r ∈ R Z p and outputs the private key
To encrypt M to the receiver set S (where |S| ≤ n), the algorithm defines Y = (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y n ) T as the coefficient vector of P S [Z] from equation (2) . It then picks s ← R Z p and computes the ciphertext as
αs · e(C 2 , D 2 ).
Applying the KP-ABE Conversion. The above IBBE can be considered as a linear IBBE system with n 1 = n − 1, n 2 = 1 and the family F is defined by taking all functions of the following forms ranging over h 0 , h 1 , · · · , h n ∈ G:
where the vector Y = {y 1 , · · · , y n )
T is defined from the polynomial P S [Z] in equation (2) as usual. In addition, the function D is the computation in equation (3), which can be show to have linearity as required. The resulting KP-ABE has constant-size ciphertexts. This comes with the expense of longer private keys of size O(tn), where t is the number of attributes in the access structure.
Our Proposal
Here we give a generic construction just like the above transformation: Let Π IBBE = (Setup , Keygen , Encrypt , Decrypt ) be a linear IBBE system. Then we construct an efficient outsourcing KP-ABE scheme with energy efficiency from Π IBBE as follows:
This algorithm computes the outsourcing private key for data user. After input the secret key sk (L,π) and a random T emp ∈ Z * p which acts as the key to mask the real secret key, this algorithm outputs the outsourced secret key sk
for this data user
The data user preserves T emp for final decryption. 4. Encrypt(mpk, M, ω): It simply outputs Encrypt (mpk, M, ω) → (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ). 5. Outsourcing Decrypt(mpk, sk (L,π) , (L, π), C, ω): Assume first that the policy (L, π) is satisfied by the attribute set ω, so that decryption is possible. Let I = {i|π(i) ∈ ω}. The cloud calculates the reconstruction constants {(i, u i )} i∈I = Recon L,π (ω). It parses
which we prove correctness below. It compute
where we recall that Σ i∈I λ i u i = 1. 6. Decrypt(T empDecrypt, T emp): On inputs T empDecrypt and T emp, this algorithm finally obtains e(g, g)
Correctness. We can verify that equation (3) is correct. First from a property of keys in linear IBBE, we have that
where each equality holds from linearity and correctness of D respectively. And the correctness of Decrypt algorithm follows easily. Our technique is same as [14] 
Security Analysis
We have the following security theorem on our proposal (denoted as KP-OABE):
Theorem 3 If the underlying IBBE scheme is selectively secure, then so is the resulting KP-OABE system. More precisely, for any selective-set adversary A against the KP-OABE construction, there is an INDsID-CPA adversary B against the IBBE scheme and we have:
More concretely, our KP-ABE scheme with outsourced decryption is selectively CPA-secure assuming that the scheme of Attrapdung [4] is an selectively CPA-secure IBBE scheme.
Proof We construct a simple IND-sID-CPA adversary B against the IBBE scheme assuming that a selectiveset attacker A has non-negligible advantage against the KP-OABE system. Namely, B plays the role of As challenger and interacts with his own challenger in the IBBE security game. Here, we call the challenger of IBBE as
The game begins with our KP-OABE adversary A choosing an attribute set ω * that intends to attack. The Attrapdung IBBE adversary B then announces S * = {i ∈ ω * } as her target set of receivers. The system-wide Attrapdung IBBE public key that B receives from her challenger are relayed to A as system-wide parameters for the our KP-OABE scheme.
1. Init. KP-OABE adversary A chooses the set of attribute set ω * it wishes to be challenged upon and sends to B. 2. Setup. The challenger C I computes the public key M P K = (g, e(g, g) α , f 1 , f 2 , F, n, n 1 , n 2 ) and sends these to the adversary A. 3. Phase 1. In this phase the simulator B answers the following queries by A. And B constructs the corresponding key table Q, then it answers the adversarys queries as follows: A may ask for the private key of any access structure (L, π) such that ω * does not satisfy (L, π). To answer such a query, let L ω * be the sub-matrix formed by the rows of L that correspond to an attribute in ω * .
T is not in the row space of L ω * , there must exist an efficiently computable vector w such that L ω * · w = 0 and < 1, w > = 0. Let h denote the value of < 1, w > = 0. Let h denote the value < 1, w >. To construct a private key, B has to define a vector u = a · β such that . B implicitly sets u as u = v + ψ · w, where
T is a randomly chosen vector and ψ = (α − v 1 )/h, so that (1, w) = α. To generate triples (D i,1 , D i,2 , D i,3 ) for each row of L, B proceeds as follows: 
where each equality holds from linearity and correctness of D respectively. And the correctness of Decrypt algorithm follows easily. Security. Here we roughly analysis the security of this proposal. The main difference between this proposal and the above one is this: in Outsourcing KeyGen algorithm, the outsourced key is
For z is unknown to the adversary, thus the adversary can not easily derive the real decryption key. In this subsection, we compare our work with the previous work, with the emphasis on the ciphertext length. OD-ABE denotes outsourcing decryption of ABE, OD-ABE-V denotes outsourcing decryption of ABE with verifiability, OD/E/K-ABE-V denotes outsourcing decryption/encryption/key generation of ABE with verifiability, OD-C-ABE denotes outsourcing decryption of ABE with constant ciphertexts. We also note our scheme can easily achieve verifiability property by adapting the technique presenting in [22] , which is the most efficient one until now. From the above table, we can see our proposal is the most energy efficient scheme for mobile users when outsourcing the decryption of attribute based encryption to the cloud, which will has important applications for mobile users, while this is a more and more common setting in our life.
Feature and Performance Analysis
Feature Comparison
Performance Analysis
We roughly evaluate the performance of our second proposal. According to the benchmark of JPBC, based on the testbed3 which with the following hardware platforms: HTC Desire HD A9191, Android 2.2 (Java Port) [27] , we give the comparison results between Green et al.'s scheme [14] and our scheme, which can be seen in Table II , III, IV and Fig. 6, 7, 8, 9 . These performance evaluation results show our second proposal is practical. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the issue of outsourcing decryption of ABE for mobile devices with energy efficiency. We give two proposals. The first one is based on a novel permutation technique for access structure and attributes, which can be used for self-enclosed system. The second one is based on ABE schemes with constant ciphertexts for mobile users in the cloud setting. We propose a generic construction for outsourced ABE based on Attrapadung et al. generic construction of ABE. We think the ciphertext length is an important issue for outsourcing for it directly affect the battery's energy consuming, the more shorter the ciphertexts are, the more surviving time the mobile phones can support. However, we also note our result is very basic, many open problems are leaving such as proving proposing outsourcing decryption of ABE candidates with constant ciphertexts and constant private 
